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Culture in Social Theory
Greg Beckett
The concept of 'culture' is central to both
social theory in general (which can also be
conceived of as the human sciences) and
anthropology in particular, but exactly what
culture 'is' remains problematic. Indeed, the
general consensus in social theory seems to be that
culture is not a 'thing' at all, but rather a process
through which people live their lives. I suggest,
following theorists such as Bourdieu, Giddens,
Williams and others, that the cultural process
mediates between what can be seen as the two
essential categories in all social theory - the
objective (materiaVstructural) and subjective
(ideationaVsocial) domains. The purpose of this
paper, then, is to engage some of the various
theoretical analyses of culture (or practice, etc.)
into one discourse, so as to define the key elements
at issue in any social analysis, and to suggest a
specific role that anthropology can play in relation
to a general theoretical analysis of cultures, social
systems and social actors.
If it is the case that social theory in
general is always an attempt to deal with the
duality between subjects and objects, then any
attempt to theorize culture as a process that
mediates between these two seemingly separate
domains must first attempt to move beyond the
duality itself, and then attempt to remove any form
of determinism which preferences one domain
over the other. To begin with, the first suggestion
is that subjects and objects are only analytically
separable. This can be traced back at least to Marx,
who in the 18th Brumaire wrote the famous lines:
Men make their own history, but they do
not make it just as they please; they do not
make it under circumstances chosen by
themselves, but under circumstances
directly encountered, given and
transmitted from the past. (1869: 15)
For Marx, the material aspects of society
(the mode of production) and the ideational aspects
(the way people think and act) are intimately
coimected in specific historical realizations. Other
philosophers linked the realm of ideas and the
realm of 'the real' before Marx, but for a variety of
reasons Marx and Marxism have been particularly
important in social theory in the last half of this
century, and it is precisely because of his
importance that he provides such a salient starting
point. In fact, many of the prominent elements of
a theorization of the mediation between social
systems (as objective 'things') and social actors (as
subjective groups) can be seen in Marx's historical
materialism and his critique of the capitalist mode
of production. However, though Marx may have
argued otherwise, his historical materialism is a
deterministic mode of analysis that, though it links
the material and ideational domains, still
preferences the mode of production. Thus, the
economic system becomes the base on which an
entire cultural superstructure rests, and from the
relations engendered by a mode of production
come specific social groups (classes) and specific
forms of consciousness. This notion of a
determining base and determined superstructure
has been held to be the key of Marxist cultural
analyses by many (at least until the latter half of
this century) (Williams 1977: 75). Determinism
aside, what this notion of a base and a
superstructure successfully demonstrates is that the
cultural realm is only analytically separable from
the material conditions of society. Of course, in
this sort of Marxist cultural analysis, the
indissoluble, and multi-directional connections
between social groups, cultural forms and social
systems are missed, as, over time, ideas of a base
and a superstructure have become reified into
distinct and separable categories. Against this,
Raymond Williams argues for a reevaluation of all
three terms:
... We have to revalue 'determination'
towards the setting of limits and the
exertion of pressure, and away from a
predicted, prefigured and controlled
content. We have to revalue
'superstructure' towards a related range of
cultural practices, and away from a
reflected, reproduced or specifically
dependent content. And, crucially, we
have to revalue 'the base' away from the
notion of a fixed economic or
technological abstraction, and towards the
specific activities of men in real social and
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economic relationships, containing
fundamental contradictions and variations
and therefore always in a state of dynamic
process. (Williams 1980: 34).
So, the notion of a uni-directional
mechanical determinism (of the base over the
superstructure) is untenable in a cultural analysis,
but the idea of determination, which is linked to
the idea that social groups 'make their own
history', is still necessary. Allowing determination
to remain qualifies the idea of agency or action;
determination is the setting of limits or constraints
on the action of social groups (Williams 1977: 85).
The move that is being made here is one that
resists the conflation of the subjective domain of
social groups and their consciousness from the
objective domain of the (economic) mode of
production which sets the conditions of society.
Instead, a re-formulated Marxism allows for a
conceptualization of culture as the process which
mediates between these seemingly separable
domains of action or practice. In reality, though
there is no -ism named for such a view, we must
conceptualize human societies as constituted by a
whole matrix which includes both the
objective/material relations in which people live
and the subjective/ideational relations through
which they experience their lives. Stuart Hall
(1977) expresses this another way. For him, the
base-superstructure formation must be rethought of
in terms of a structure-superstructure complex.
What is most important for Hall on this point is the
principle of determinacy, which is the "structured
sum of the different determinations" (1977: 327).
As with Williams, this is to be thought of not as a
final or mechanistic determinism, but as real
constraints that exist, as the limits within and
against which social agents' act.
To further elaborate a place for culture,
the ideas of the objective and subjective domains
of society, and the process that mediates between
them all need to be reformulated. Until now, I
myself have let these terms seem unproblematic,
but in reality they may be some of the most
difficult words to define, as they tend to be used
differently by different theorists. The central
problem that I am concerned with here is based on
the ideas of what system, structure, culture and
agency all mean. Following Giddens' theory of
structuration, it seems that the first two ideas that
need to be reworked are 'system' and 'structure',
as these have tended to be collapsed into one
another previously, especially in functionalist
theories of society (Giddens 1979: 61). What
Giddens proposes, and what I also suggest, is tbat
the social system be viewed as the set of
organizing principles, as the processes that
engender specific relationships between the
elements that the system organizes. Thus, systems
only exist as logical sets of related (though
sometimes contradictory) ideas. This is close to
Marx's notion of a mode of production, which can
only be understood in terms of the means and
relations of production that it both needs and
creates. In contrast to this, social structures are the
embodiment of a social system in time and space.
For Giddens, structure is better conceptualized as
"structuring properties" which provide the
"binding of time and space in social systems"
(1979: 64). The progressive mood is important
here, for it clearly illustrates the necessity of
temporal specificity in any discussion of social
structures. That is, structures are to be thought of
as emergent forms or historical realizations of a
social system.
This emphasis on time and the historical
formation of social systems and structures is again
reminiscent of Marx, whose material analysis of
modes of production was explicitly historical. In
fact, one of the central problems that Giddens was
working on was precisely how systems are
maintained or changed over time - that is, he was
theorizing about the mechanism for the
reproduction or transformation of social systems.
For Giddens, any such discussion must include a
discussion of agency and action (and in fact it must
unite a discussion of agency with a discussion of
structures). In recent anthropological discourse, it
seems that the concept of agency has come to
mean something close to individual, autonomous
action. However, building on Giddens' use of that
word, I suggest that the proper way to view the
term agency is as a theory of social action. This
itself entails several specific points. First, action is
to be seen as a continuous flow rather than a
discrete list of events. Thus, it is something that
social beings are always doing. Second, though it
may be more or less constrained (that is, subject to
determinations), action is never determined fully -
social actors could always have acted otherwise
(Giddens 1979: 55-56). Beyond this, however,
action should be conceived of as a historically
specific and emergent process. Thus, social actors
are continuously engaged in acting.
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But how should we think of 'social
actors'? For Marx, individual human actors were
never separable from the general social relations in
which they were enmeshed. Thus, the notion of
social classes became his primary category or unit
of analysis. In a similar way, social agents or
actors should here be read as social groups, for
though individuals do act and engage with social
structures through time, they do so in relation to
other actors. This is not, however, to suggest that
we take up Marx's class-based analysis
exclusively, for it may be that the social groups
that are relevant for any particular analysis are not
defined primarily by their (economic) class
position. For example, it could be the ethnic
fragmentation within a class position that is
important in particular situations, or something
else altogether.
But how does a notion of social groups
acting help us to answer the question of the nature
of the reproduction or transformation of social
systems? The general idea is that the process of
social groups interactIng over time with social
structures (as the embodiments of a system) will
either reproduce or transform that system.
Precisely how such a process might work needs to
be examined more closely before we can begin a
discussion of where culture fits in. In this regard, it
will again prove helpful to begin with Marx.
Following Hegel, Marx was interested in
the dialectical nature of social systems. His
generative scheme for societies, which involved
movement through different modes of production,
placed the engine of change from one mode to
another within the system itself. That is, there
exists some irreconcilable contradiction within any
mode of production that will provide a space for
one group to transform society (and thus establish
a new mode of production, which brings new
relations). Giddens and others have maintained this
dialectical or contradictory conceptualization of
social systems. However, the presence of
contradictions within the propositional set which
makes up a system is not enough to successfully
provide a basis for a theory of social reproduction
and transformation, because the precise nature of
how any such contradictions can manifest, or how
they can be concealed, necessitates a discussion of
ideology and of the relation between social
production and material production.
In a strict Marxist framework, the
reproduction of social forms and of the material
existence are linked - specifically, social actors
reproduce themselves (their consciousness, classes,
and subjective modes of living) through an
engagement with social structures that the material
mode of production (the social system for Marx)
engenders (Hall 1977: 315). In his critique of the
capitalist mode of production, Marx was most
concerned with the contradiction between the idea
of capital and private property (the ownership of
the means of production) and the idea of labour (as
a uniquely human attribute which becomes
commodified in a capitalist system). But in a more
general sense, the contradiction is between two
distinct, and historically formed, classes - the
bourgeoisie who own the means of production and
the proletariat who must sell their labour power.
The maintenance of this system can only depend
on the successful concealment, by the ruling class,
of the contradictory interests of capital and labour.
The real engine for social transformation, then,
becomes class-consciousness, which provides an
awareness of the 'real' objective/material
conditions of the capitalist social system, and the
only possibility for the reproduction of the
capitalist mode would be the continued
concealment of these material conditions. That is,
only social actors engaged with the social system
can reproduce it - systems cannot maintain
themselves (despite what functional anthropology
says). Any theorization of the connections between
the domain of social groups and that of social
systems will thus have to be based on certain ideas
of consciousness, ideology, and power.
To understand the role that ideology plays,
and exactly what it is, it is necessary to understand
how Marx used the term. First, realize that Marx
was explicitly arguing against Hegelian idealism in
German philosophy. As such, his historical
materialism had the creation of consciousness and
of ideas following from the 'real' conditions of
society, by which he of course meant the material
conditions or the mode of production. There are
two important aspects here. First, Marx says that
the "production of ideas, of conceptions, of
consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with
the material activity and the material intercourse of
men" (Marx & Engels 1947: 47). Second, he
makes the nature of this connection clear when he
says that:
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Men are the producers of their
conceptions, ideas, etc. - real, active men,
as they are conditioned by a definite
development of their productive forces ...
Consciousness can never be anything else
than conscious existence, and the
existence of men is their actual life-
process. If in all ideology men and their
circumstances appear upside-down as in a
camera obscura, this phenomenon arises
just as much from their historical life-
process as the inversion of objects on the
retina does from their physical life-
process. (1947: 47)
Consciousness is determined by the
material conditions in which people live their lives.
Here Marx comes close to formulating a cultural
theory, though he does not pursue it. He does,
however, make a crucial distinction between
consciousness and ideology. Consciousness is
determined by life; it is practical and arises out of
the way people live. In contrast, ideology is a set
of historically formed ideas that obfuscates and
naturalizes the conditions of existence. What is
important, though, is that ideology is not what is
obscured or concealed, but rather it is the domain
of ideas that are most openly available. Thus, it is
only the 'real' conditions of production that are
concealed (Hall 1977: 325).
But both consciousness and ideology in
Marxist theory are linked specifically to the mode
of production, and in fact the dominant ideology in
a society will be the ideology of the ruling class.
This conceptualization necessitate a theory of
power, and power for Marx should perhaps best be
seen as structural domination of the ruling class
over other classes. In a Marxist theory of culture,
then, a social system becomes embodied in
structures (e.g. the mode of production, political
institutions, etc.) and in the practices and
discourses with which social actors are engaged.
Social systems, conceived of as sets of
propositions and relations that organize society,
are both integrative and contradictory, and these
principles of integration and contradiction will be
expressed in the cultural domain. Ruling
ideologies both serve to integrate groups in
specific relations and to conceal contradictions that
would expose what for Marx were the 'real'
relations of production. Perhaps more satisfying
than this use of ideology is Gramsci's use of
hegemony as a total orgamzmg and integrating
principle that naturalizes the social order. This
itself can only make sense in relation to
alternatives, or what Gramsci called counter-
hegemonies, for without this, social systems
become completely determining and
transformation and change cannot be accounted
for. The fundamental aspects of hegemony that
make it more useful than ideology, are that
hegemony must be secured and constantly
maintained over time (i.e. transformation can occur
by the replacement of one hegemonic system with
a counter-hegemony), and that it cannot be
maintained only by a ruling class, but in fact must
be accepted and internalized by other social groups
(Hall 1977: 333).
As we move towards a theory of culture,
then, the above discussion means any such theory
will need to conjoin the subjective, experiential
domain with the objective, structural domain. If
culture is to be placed as the mediator between
these two analytic categories, then a discussion of
ideology and hegemony leads directly to a
discussion of power and action, and their relation
to structures. Following Giddens, I suggest that
power can be either the ability of an actor to
achieve his or her will, or structural domination by
one group over another - that is, power is both
transformative capacity and domination. The
difference lies in the differential uses of resources,
which are always mediums for power (Giddens
1979: 91). Social practices, ways of living, action
or cultural, are all ways of naming the process
through which social groups use resources to either
maintain the social system or transform it. All
action involves power, and power is never
completely held by one group over another:
... Power relations are relations of
autonomy and dependence, but even the
most autonomous agent is in some degree
dependent, and the most dependent actor
or party in a relationship retains some
autonomy. (Giddens 1979: 93)
Here Giddens leaves the necessary space
for a social theory that deals with both
reproduction and transformation. The next step is
to theorize about the nature of action and
consciousness. Giddens distinguishes between
several different degrees of conscious action: 1)
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consciousness, which enables actors to express
their intentions discursively.
2) practical consciousness, which is tacit
knowledge that actors possess, but which they do
not formulate discursively, and 3)
unconsciousness, which is the realm of
unexamined motivations (wants and desires)
(Giddens 1979: 57 -58). This multi-leveled
formulation of the wide domain of consciousness
further opens up a space for action in social theory,
because it removes the more rigid notion of
conscious, ideological domination of a ruling class
in opposition to the false consciousness of the
proletariat that emerges in many Marxist theories.
It also allows for a range of differential levels of
awareness of the social conditions in which action
occurs, and in which people live. So, if Marxism
says that social actors make history, but not under
conditions of their own choosing, than we can
extend this to social actors reproducing society
under conditions which they may be more or less
conscious of. The final move that Giddens makes
along this line is to distinguish between the
intended and unintended outcomes of action, so
that even if the action of social actors is directed
towards a specific end, that action may have
consequences which the actors themselves did not
intend or desire, and of which they may not even
be consciously aware (Giddens 1979: 59). Of
course, unintentional outcomes may themselves
become the basis for further action, because social
groups do not only act, they also react to the
conditions in which they live.
Giddens' theory of structuration provides a
framework in which to place a theory of culture,
but this itself might be more attainable if we move
from his notion of practical consciousness and
action to Bourdieu's theory of practice, which is
likewise committed to the establishment of a
dialectical relation between the objective and
subjective domains, and to a theory of the
reproduction of the social system by social actors
(Bourdieu 1972: 3). As is the case for Giddens and
his notion of practical consciousness, Bourdieu is
interested in the rules which are not discursively
available to social actors, but which they
nevertheless seem to reproduce, and which seem to
guide the sorts of practices which reproduce social
systems over time (1972: 17). For Bourdieu, social
agents are the producers and reproducers of the
objective conditions of society (and thus of the
social system) because their actions are in part
determined by their own formation. The key
analytic concept which Bourdieu brings out here is
his notion of habitus, which is the
... durably installed generative principle
of regulated improvisations, [which]
produces practices which tend to
reproduce the regularities immanent in the
objective conditions of the production of
their generative principles ... (1972: 78)
That is, habitus is the effect of historical
determinations on social actors, and it constrains
the action or practice of social agents in a way they
themselves are unaware of. More than that, the
product of practices determined by the habitus is
meant to be precisely those conditions or
principles of production which created the habitus
in the first place (1972: 79). It is thus the constraint
on practice that makes social agents both the
product of a historically specific social system and
the (re)producers of that system. This is, in part,
similar to the general idea of socialization, in that
it is based on the internalization, by social agents,
of the principles of a social system through the
medium of social structures and culture in which
agents are produced, though it differs in that
socialization is usually conceived of as internalized
through a variety of social learning processes. In
contrast to socialization, the habitus, appears as
natural rather than social or historical (Bourdieu
1972: 78). As such, the notion of habitus is similar
to hegemony, but the difference lies in the degree
of explicit power that operates to maintain this
naturalization of an arbitrary though historical
social order, and the degree to which alternatives
can be said to exist. As an analytic concept,
habitus provides us with a space in which to talk
about subjectivity and identity. More specifically,
it provides us with a space to talk about the
formation of certain identities and what those
identities might mean. This provides the necessary
movement away from discussions of action, power
and determined constraints and towards a
discussion of how, exactly, people are both formed
by those constraints, and, more importantly, what
they might do within such constraints. This is, I
believe, the area which Giddens meant to capture
with his notion of 'agency'.
Bourdieu's theory of practice, and more
specifically his notion of habitus, brings us full
circle back to discussions of naturalization. Taken
together, as a single discourse on the processes
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through which systems reproduce themselves,
Marx, (and the later cultural Marxists such as
Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall), Gramsci,
Giddens and Bourdieu all provide theories that
overlap and converge. Whatever the precise nature
of the cultural process might be, it seems to
include the various processes that these theorists
have outlined: ideology, determination, hegemony
and counter-hegemony, action, power, habitus and
practice. So, if social systems are to be seen as
dialectical in a double sense - that is, as both in a
dialectical relation to social agents and internally
contradictory - then I suggest that the process that
mediates this dialectical relationship must itself be
complex and relational. That is, the processes that
conjoin social groups and social systems can be
viewed as a set of disjunctions, as a series of
potential processes (...or. ..or. ..or. .. or). This
disjunctive series, which I suggest we call
'culture', is then a list of the ways in which social
groups are formed by systems and the ways in
which systems are produced and reproduced by
social groups. The particular aspects of these
formations cannot be theorized in a general sense,
but rather must be examined historically.
What I have sought to do so far in this
paper is mark the bounds within which a theory of
culture can exist. The first move must be to locate
culture between the domain of social groups and
social systems. But this can only be done if the
entire relationship between groups, cultures and
systems is analyzed historically, and if the
separation of the subjective and objective domains
remains only an analytic one. Marx and Giddens
provide successful theories for the connection
between the material and social conditions of
society, as well as theories of the nature of the
reproduction of social systems by social groups.
As discussed above, this can only be achieved
through a variety of processes happening over
time. For Marx, reproduction is based on the
ideological domination of a ruling class and
transformation is based on the attainment of
awareness of the true material conditions of
society (class-consciousness). For Gramsci,
EJ
reproduction occurs through the hegemonic
domination of society, which itself necessitates the.
naturalization and internalization of the existent
social order by all social groups, not just the ruling
class, and transformation is achieved through the
preferencing of a counter-hegemonic discourse.
Raymond Williams focuses on culture itself,
defined as the whole social and material process
that is determined by historical conditions
(Williams 1977: 138).
Beyond these rough definitions of what
sorts of processes might mediate the social and
material realm (ideology, hegemony or culture),
we have Giddens' and Bourdieu's formulations of
social reproduction. Taken together, they provide a
range of processes from the historical emergence
of structures that embody the abstract propositions
of a social system to the realm of action, practical
consciousness and habitus. Giddens provides a
more adequate theorization of action and power
than either Marx or Gramsci, and Bourdieu's
theory of practice and his notion of the habitus
provide an added dimension in which the social
order is naturalized without overt implications of a
ruling class that seeks such a naturalization (as in
Marx's use of ideology), or without the need to
consider the constant maintenance of categories
(for the habitus is both 'built-in' and durable).
All of the above theories contribute to a
social theory of culture if the question of 'what is
culture?' becomes 'how does culture do things and
what does it do?' The answer to this second
question is that culture, as a totality of processes
that mediate between social groups and social
systems, provides the processes through which
social groups are formed, and the processes
through which social groups either reproduce or
transform the social system. 'Culture' is bounded
by the totality of consciousness, unconsciousness,
practical consciousness, habitus, action, ideology,
determination and hegemony. It emerges where all
of these separate conceptualizations overlap. In the
simplest sense, such a theory of culture can be
illustrated in the following way:
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If I have at least succeeded in bounding
the limits in which we can place culture for the
purposes of analysis (for in reality, the elements of
the model proposed above cannot be separated
from one another), then it would be seem
necessary to consider the possible ways in which
culture itself is either produced or transformed, for
this itself would be the process of reproduction or
transformation of the social system. This means
that we would need to talk about the social
production of identities, hegemony, action, etc.
Marx himself realized that his economic 'base'
was most importantly about the 'real' relations
between people as they engage in material
production, and following Marx, theorists such as
Giddens and Gramsci have placed an emphasis on
the sociality of production. For most, it is primarily
the use of power (whether direct or indirect) that is
implicated in the reproduction of social systems.
As such, I suggest that the contribution of
anthropology to social theory lies not a
theorization of 'culture', or social reproduction in
the general sense, but rather in the production of
historic and particular accounts of such processes.
Others, however, disagree. Consider how
Margaret Archer, in her book Culture and Agency,
outlines a theory of the connection between the
domain of culture and social groups. The
suggestion is that there is also a systemic analysis
available for culture that can illustrate the links
between the cultural and structural domains. This
of course must rest on a definition of culture:
... At any given time a Cultural System
is ... all things capable of being grasped,
deciphered, understood or known by
someone... By definition the cultural
intelligibilia form a system, for all items
are expressed in a common language ...
(Archer 1988: 104)
The central problems with which Archer
is concerned, are: I) the lack of theorization of
'culture', 2) the problem of the conflation of social
systems and social groups, and 3) the problem of
the conflation of cultural and structural analyses.
Like Giddens, she argues against the preferencing
of either a determining social system (as in Marx's
economic base) or a determining realm of ideas
.and' social groups (as in Hegelian idealism). But
A'rcher goes further by suggesting that Giddens'
theory itself conflates the objective domain of
social systems from the subjective domain of
social agents precisely because he lacks a specific
theorization of culture. This itself is a point well
taken (and it has been taken up in this paper,
though in a different way). More than this, though,
Archer is concerned with the damage done by the
reduction of action and practical consciousness to
an essentially structuralist analysis which
preferences the social system as the 'hidden motor'
that generates the cultural domain and social
groups (Archer 1988: 282). Again, there does seem
to be a tendency to preference a structuralist
analysis (usually some derivative of Marxism),
especially in anthropology. However, this itself is
an historical formation that is connected to
anthropology's self-critic and its subsequent
'political' or 'moral' agenda (both of which are
connected to changes in social theory in general in
the latter half of this century).
The question that I think is important is
'how successful is it to theorize a general cultural
system?' I have deliberately left the idea of culture
vague in this paper, preferring instead to attempt to
only mark the boundaries of culture by suggesting
the multiplicity of processes which constitute it.
Archer, on the other hand, is theorizing about the
specific and systematic relations between the
cultural system and the social system. Specifically,
she wants to examine how culture influences
structure and how structure influences culture
(1988: 285). What I would like to suggest is that
any attempt to write a general program for
precisely how culture does what it does (how it
mediates between our analytic categories of
'agents' and 'systems') is doomed from the
beginning. First, a conceptualization of a cultural
system is not a successful way of talking about
culture in social theory, or especially in
anthropology. The advantages that Archer's
analysis affords do not outweigh the damages that
may be done by conceiving of culture as a system.
As I stated at the beginning, culture is best
conceived of as the process of mediation between a
social system and social actors. Systematic
approaches to culture, rather than processual one,
reify culture itself and offer it up to quasi-
structuralist analyses (which Archer does, though
she also argues against it). The specific mediatory
processes of culture, which join agents and
systems, cannot be theorized generally - they only
make sense if approached through particular
historicaVethnographic frames. In this sense, the
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formulation outlined here (which follows from the
theories of Marx, Giddens and Bourdieu) is more
successful for anthropology as it does not make
any claims as to the form that cultural processes
will take or how they will operate. The 'hidden
motor' which Archer points out does exist, but this
in itself is not as problematic as she suggests, for it
need not be the structural domain that is
preferenced (that is, anthropologists can and have
preferenced the domain of social agents and
experience, pushing a hermeneutic analysis over a
structuralist one). These preferences are perhaps
necessary by-products of the specific intentions of
the researcher and the specific nature of the
fieldwork experience, and in anthropology, at
least, the space for analyses to emerge fron1 the
ethnographic 'data' is a blessing, not a curse.
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